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The Supreme Court, Social Psychology,
and Group Formation

Neal Devins and Will Federspiel

The justices of the Supreme Court function not only as individuals, but as
members of groups. One group of which they are part is the Court itself, as
discussed in Wendy Martinek's chapter in this volume (ch. 5). But they can also
come together to form important subgroups. In this chapter, we examine a
particular type of subgroup that we refer to as a majority coalition—a group of
ideologically simpatico justices who are able to issue unambiguous, far-reaching
decisions, as opposed to fact-specific decisions of limited consequence. We
employ social psychology literature to better understand when the Court will
and will not function as a cohesive coalition. In so doing, we also comment on
the models political scientists use to describe Supreme Court decision making.
Our principal claim is intuitively obvious but in tension with much of the
political science literature. Political science models of Supreme Court decision making typically focus on the legal and policy goals of individual
justices—so that the key question concerns the legal policy preferences of
the median justice and the ideological gap between the median justice and
other members of the Court. We think the political science models focus too
much on the individual and not enough on the group (including the reasons
why individuals do or do not join groups). Specifically, when there is an
ideologically simpatico majority coalition, intragroup dynamics play a prominent role in determining the reach of Supreme Court decisions. More to
the point, the individual preferences of tie median justice are less consequential on a cohesive Court—since the median justice will (up to a point) give in
to intragroup pressures to uniformity. In contrast, the preferences of the
median justice play a more prominent role on an ideologically diverse
85
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Court. At the same time, these preferences may not mirror the policy views of
the median justice. In refusing to join forces with an ideologically cohesive
coalition, the median justice is likely to place a high value on personal power
and reputation. In other words, median justices on ideologically diverse
Courts have comparatively weaker legal policy preferences and are willing
(up to a point) to sublimate those preferences in order to pursue other goals.
We begin with a brief tour of the chief political science models, highlighting the ways in which those models focus on individuated legal and policy
preferences. We then turn to social psychology to examine both the importance
of and obstacles to group formation. Finally, by comparing differences in
decision-making styles of the (largely simpatico) New Deal Court and the
(very diverse) Rehnquist Court, we illustrate how social psychology can contribute to an understanding of Supreme Court decision making.

The Political Science Models
The dominant political science models posit that Supreme Court justices are
principally interested in pursuing favored policies. The attitudinal model
assumes that judges vote "reflexively in each case; that is, they cast their votes
based solely on their individual reactions to the facts and legal issues presented,
rather than by considering, in addition, how judges or institutions are likely to
react to the decision" (Merrill, 2003, p. 591; Segal & Spaeth, 2002). A second
model, the strategic model, posits that judges take the reaction of others into
account when advancing their policy preferences. A Supreme Court justice, for
example, might calibrate a decision in order to secure the votes of other
justices—so that the Court will embrace a decision that most closely matches
the justice's preferred policy outcome (Epstein & Knight, 1998; Maltzman,
Spriggs, & Wahlbeck, 2000). Alternatively, a justice might take implementation
concerns into account and, with it, potential resistance from either elected
officials (Epstein & Knight, 1998; Segal, 1997) or the American people
(Mishler & Sheehan, 1996). In recent years, some political scientists have tweaked
the attitudinal and strategic models. Institutionalists "shift their focus away from
the long-standing question of how institutions are affected by the personal
characteristics of judges and toward the question of how judges are affected by
the institutional characteristics within which they are embedded" (Gillman,
1999, p. 66). In this way, judges act strategically to pursue both policy and legal
goals (federalism, separation of powers, adherence to precedent). At the same
lime, institutionalists focus on an individual justice's pursuit of legal policy goals.
The "most influential models of judicial behavior share not only a basic
assumption but also a limitation, the lack of a persuasive theory of judges'
motivations" (Baum, 2006, p. 19; see also Baum in this volume, ch. 1).
Notwithstanding their differences, the attitudinal, strategic, and institutional
models all assume that justices are single-minded maximizers of legal and policy
preferences. Differences between the models turn on whether justices act
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strategically and whether justices are pursuing legal or policy objectives. For this
very reason, the median justice plays a central role in all three models. All
models, for example, think that power resides at the median—so that the
most powerful justice is "the Justice in the middle of a distribution of Justices,
such that (in an ideological distribution, for example) half the Justices are to the
right of (more 'conservative' than) the median and half are to the left of (more
`liberal' than) the median" (Martin et al., 2005, p. 1277). To pick a simple
example, if the Court is split 5 to 4, the median justice would be the weakest
member of the majority coalition. Under the attitudinal model, the median
justice would only sign an opinion she agreed with and, as such, the majority
might move closer to her position (so long as they too agreed with the final
opinion) or, alternatively, the median Justice might write a consequential
concurring opinion that would limit the reach of the majority or plurality
opinion. The strategic and institutional models likewise see the median's view
as controlling. Not only might the median write a consequential concurring
opinion, but other justices in the majority—fearing possible defection—might
move their opinion closer to the median's preferred legal or policy position.
The power of the median justice is variable, and that variability will call
attention both to commonalities and differences between the political science
models and a model that makes use of social psychology. For the political
science models, medians are most powerful when there is substantial ideological distance between the median and other members of the Court—so that
the median sits between one group of justices substantially to the right and
another group of justices substantially to the left (Epstein & Jacobi, 2008).
During the 2006 term, for example, Justice Anthony Kennedy was a "supermedian"; among other measures, he was a member of the winning coalition in
each case decided by a 5-to-4 vote. In sharp contrast, medians are least
powerful when their preferences overlap with the preferences of justices to
their right or left. This convergence of preferences, moreover, makes it more
likely that there will be an ideologically simpatico majority coalition of
justices. When this happens, the Court is likely to issue consequential opinions, for a "majority coalition sharing great unity of mind has the ability to
adopt whatever rule it would like" (Staudt et al., 2008, p. 369).
We agree with these conclusions but nevertheless feel that the political
science models are incomplete because their policy-preference-driven focus is
too narrow and ignores basic psychological concepts. As we discuss below, the
power of the median is diminished on an ideologically simpatico Court
because the median justice is a member of a majority coalition and pressures
toward uniformity will diminish the preferences of any individual justice.
Correspondingly, although median justices are more likely to assume power
on an ideologically diverse Court, the unwillingness of a median justice to join
one or another group is not simply a matter of ideological or jurisprudential
divergence. Median justices do not join groups because they are less interested
in the pursuit of some ideological or legal vision and more interested in
competing values, most notably power and image.
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We are not the first to observe that justices think about more than their
legal and/or policy preferences. Lawrence Baum, both in his 2006 study Judges
and their Audiences and in his chapter in this volume, criticizes the leading
political science models for failing to take into account the desires of judges to
win approval from audiences they care about. Noting that the "Spock-like
judges of the dominant models have no interest in public approval as an end
in itself," Baum argues that political scientists need to take into account the
commonsense notion that judges, like other people, "care a great deal about
what people think of them" (Baum, 2006, p. 22). We agree and will discuss
how impression management figures into the willingness of a justice to be
part of a coalition of justices. Unlike Baum, however, the approach taken in
this chapter also applies social psychology to describe the interplay between
the justices themselves.

Social Psychology and Coalition Formation on the Supreme
Court
Before turning to what the psychological literature teaches us about group
formation, let us begin by clarifying our central concept. By a coalition, we do
not necessarily mean a set of justices who vote together all or nearly all the
time. Instead, a coalition of justices is a set of justices who coalesce around an
issue or a set of issues that are highly important or salient to the justices
involved, and who vote and act together in the relevant issue space. This
coalescing need not be a conscious decision made by the justices in the sense
that they consciously choose to form a coalition on a particular issue, but is
rather a recognition on the part of the justices involved of a shared set of goals
or opinions that are salient for each individual justice. Unlike in the dominant
political science models, coalitions of justices are not simply individuals who
share a similar legal and/or policy preference. instead, social psychology
indicates that where a coalition forms, the very presence of such a subgroup
will have profound effects both on the action of other coalition members and
on the development of the opinions and reasoning of other coalition mem- bers (Stangor, 2004, p. 3; Cartwright & Zander, 1968, pp. 3-2l). This, of
course, is not to say that legal policy preferences are irrelevant to the formation of subgroups of justices. An individual's personal beliefs are key to
coalition formation. At the same time, membership in a coalition transcends
the individualized preferences of coalition members.
Importance of Group Formation
When a majority coalition forms, group dynamics play a crucial role in the
Court's decision making. This is because when people align themselves as part
of a group, powerful psychological pressures begin to bear on the members of
the group. The most important of these pressures is the pressure to
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uniformity that occurs in groups. Pressures to uniformity in group decision
making have long been recognized as a hallmark of group behavior and they
present themselves in several contexts (Festinger et al., 1968). First, and most
intuitively, membership in a group creates pressure to go along with the
group in order to achieve the goals for which the group was formed initially.
The more important a goal is, the more powerful this pressure is (Cartwright
& Zander, 1968). The amount of pressure to conform to a group's decision
also increases when the members are more dependent on one another in
order to achieve their goals (Festinger, 1968).
There is also evidence that the opinions of group members become more
influential for other group members. Some studies indicate that the opinions of
group members actually converge once the group has made a decision. Even in
situations where consensus among the group is not required, the opinions of
group members are influential to other members as they form their opinions
(Tinsdale et al., 2000, p. 10). Interestingly, group dynamics may actually push
group members to take more extreme positions than they might otherwise be
inclined to take (Stangor, 2004, pp. 202-203; Forsyth, 1999, p. 320).
Experiments examining this phenomenon may have special relevance to the
Court as they examined the decision making of people in a judicial setting.
Mock jury experiments indicate that where a group is predisposed to a particular outcome, discussion of the issues presented to the group has a tendency to
lead the group to adopt more extreme positions than the average group
member held prior to discussing the issues (Stangor, 2003, pp. 202-203).
Social Judgment Theory posits that people generally are most persuaded
by positions that are slightly different from the positions they already hold,
but that they are not particularly persuaded by positions that are very
different (Tindale et al., 2000, pp. 9-10; Kerr & Tindale, 2004, p. 635).
Because members of a coalition on the Court will tend to hold similar, but
not identical, views on a given issue, the opinions of the other members of the
coalition will tend to be more influential to each other than any opinions of
noncoalition members. In other words, when justices associate as a coalition,
the median member of the Court (i.e., the most moderate member of the
group) will be most susceptible to being pulled in a more liberal or conservative direction by the other members of the coalition instead of by noncoalition members.
Taken together, these psychological processes suggest that Court decision
making may be substantially affected when the justices coalesce in a majority
coalition. First, pressures to uniformity in the group indicate that members of
a group are more willing to sublimate personal preferences, as long as the
members remain committed to the core purposes of the group. Thus, where
there is a majority coalition of justices, the members will be likely to join an
opinion that may be more reflective of the coalition's preference, not necessarily the justice's individual preferences.
Further, where there is a majority coalition on the Court, the members
should tend to show greater deference to the opinion writer. The members
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should also be more likely to go along with the coalition without issuing a
consequential concurrence. This should be especially true when the issue at
hand is particularly important or salient to the group's core beliefs. And, the
opinions issued by a majority coalition of justices will not reflect the preferences of the median justice on the Court. Instead, it will be the product of the
group dynamics of the majority and may be a more extreme position than
some members of the group would have preferred on their own.
Finally, depending on the cohesiveness of the coalition, there may be a
willingness among the members to vote together on other issues, provided the
votes on those issues are not central and opposed to a justice's personal
beliefs. The more group members see the group as "significant, important,"
the more likely it is that the group will "bond together and stick together"
(Stangor, 2004, PIN/24). With respect to Supreme Court justices, norms of
independence (which typically cut against the formation of a cohesive
majority coalition) are likely to limit the willingness of group members to
form a group that cuts across all issues. It is far more likely that the group will
coalesce around a set of core issues and that the justices will act in a more
disparate way on issues that are not central to the group's identity. For
example, the New Deal Court—as we will soon discuss—was formed
around the core issue of governmental power to regulate economic conditions. Civil rights and liberties issues were not core to the formation of this
coalition and, not surprisingly, the majority coalition broke apart on civil
liberties questions.
Indeed, the bitterness that subsets of New Deal justices expressed about
each other in connection with civil rights and liberties issues backs up the
central point of this chapter: Although justices can come together to act as a
coalition on one set of core issues, at the same time, the social psychology
barriers that stand in the way of group formation also make it likely that these
justices will splinter on issues that are not central to the group's mission. We
turn to a discussion of those barriers now.

Barriers to Forming a Majority Coalition
From a group dynamics perspective, "attraction to a group for a given
individual will depend on his assessment of the desirable and undesirable
consequences attendant upon membership in the group" (Cartwright, 1968,
p. 95). For reasons we will now detail, social psychology identifies numerous
roadblocks that stand in the way of a majority coalition forming on the
Supreme Court. The most obvious roadblock (and the one hurdle that
political scientists and social psychologist agree on) is ideological diversity
among the justices. An individual will not act in ways that are inconsistent
with matters central to their cognitive network. In particular, group membership is a basic part of individual self-conception; it is a key component of how
we perceive our place in the world, throughout our lives (Forsyth, 1999,
pp. 66-80). Because of the fundamental importance of group identification
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in our lives, individuals are only willing to associate themselves meaningfully
with groups that are in sync with their core beliefs (Arrow et al., 2000, pp. 70-77;
Stangor, 2004, p. 25).
A second potential barrier to group formation is tied to an individual
justice's motivations, specifically, the need for power (Baum, ch. 1 in this
volume). An individual's need to influence others and to control or shape the
world around them, the need for power, is a basic psychological need; but it is
valued differently by different individuals, and it manifests itself differently in
different situations. In some settings, membership in a group may actually
provide an outlet for people with high needs for power because groups
present opportunities for leadership (Forsyth, 1999, p. 92). Also, an ideologically simpatico coalition may join together in order to decisively advance
the individual preferences of coalition members. However, people with a high
need for power may find it best to refrain from joining a group and instead
play the role of power broker, or "decider," between rival factions. And, of
course, for some people the need for power is simply not a sufficient enticement to join any group.
Consider, for example, the so-called swing justices who cast the deciding
votes on controversial cases. "Swing" justices exercise power by writing
consequential concurring opinions that limit the reach of the majority's
ruling or by insisting that their legal policy preferences are reflected in the
majority opinion. Like any justice, a "swing" justice will not cast votes at odds
with core beliefs. But a "swing" justice might have comparatively weak legal
policy preferences and a comparatively strong desire to exercise power. To
exercise power meaningfully, however, the Court must be ideologically
diverse (Epstein & Jacobi, 2008). An ideologically cohesive Court (with a
majority coalition of 5 or more justices) will not need the "swing" justice's
vote to advance their legal policy preferences. In this situation, the "swing"
justice might seek to exercise power by joining that coalition in the hopes of
playing a leadership role in that group (assuming that the coalition is acting in
ways consistent with her core beliefs). Alternatively, the "swing" justice might
not want to join that coalition—even if that will mean fewer opportunities to
exercise power. For example, the "swing" justice (or, for that matter, any
justice) might place a high value on external variables—most notably, how
she is perceived by audiences that she cares about. These audiences might
include journalists, law professors, lawyers' groups, other judges and justices,
political parties, interest groups, and even the public (Baum, 2006).
In paying attention to "audiences," justices engage in impression management, that is, the "process of controlling how one is perceived by other
people" (Leary, 1996, p. 2). Like group dynamics generally, impression
management is a universal phenomenon. Everyone engages in some form of
impression management every day. It is an "essential component of social
interaction" (Leary, 1996, p. 3). Like an individual's desire to exercise power,
the amount of impression management engaged in by individuals varies
significantly with the situation and the individual. For Supreme Court
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justices, there are countless opportunities to take into account their standing
with various audiences—oral argument, opinion writing, the giving of
speeches and interviews, attending social gatherings, so on and so forth. In
other words, judging on the Court is in many ways an exercise in selfpresentation, and the behavior of the justices is shaped in important ways
by the opinions of outside groups that the justices care about. More than that,
the very process by which we select justices tends "to favor those with an
especially strong interest in the esteem of other people" (Baum, 2006, p. 32).
Accepting a judgeship entails accepting relatively significant constraints on
personal activities and behaviors as well as a significant reduction in monetary
compensation. The inducement for accepting these losses is an increase in
prestige (and an increase in potential power). As a result, the types of people
who end up with judicial positions tend to be those who care a great deal
about the esteem of others.
Impression management figures prominently in the willingness of a
Supreme Court justice to join forces with others and forge a majority coalition. To start, a justice will not join a coalition if that will harm her reputation
among groups that are important to her. Just as a justice will not join a group
that would require her to vote in ways not in sync with her personal beliefs, a
justice will not hurt her standing with groups she cares about. And while some
of these groups may have identifiable ideologies (Federalist Society, American
Constitution Society), externally focused justices are well aware that the norm
of judging in the United States is that the judge is a neutral, impartial arbiter
of disputes. For some (but not all) justices, this norm tends to act as a
disincentive to be part of a unified, ideologically identifiable subgroup of
justices, because "people try to project images of themselves that are consis
-tenwihormsaptculiengadwthrolsey
occupy" (Leary, 1996, p. 67). In this way, justices have incentives to act like an
independent judge and not a member of an ideologically identifiable group.
As such, an externally focused judge—especially as compared to public
officials whose status is tied to political battles that play out in public
view—has little reason to curry favor with one or another ideologically
identifiable constituency. Justices with strong ideological precommitments,
however, will place a higher value on winning the esteem of some ideologically identifiable group. For these justices, approval by such groups may
matter more than engaging in self-presentation that is aimed at reinforcing
the norm of neutral, impartial arbiter.
Consider again our so-called swing justice. If all she cared about was
power, she would pay no mind to her reputation. Her decision to join one or
another side of a dispute would simply be an exercise in power—her efforts to
wield as much as influence as possible (either by tiling a consequential
concurring opinion or by joining one or the other side of a dispute). In
particular, she would want to maintain her "swing" justice status—so that her
vote would be critical to the resolution of any dispute. Along these lines, she
would want to locate herself at the Court's median (and, to the extent
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possible, distance herself from justices to her immediate right and left)
(Epstein & Jacobi, 2008, p. 74-81). An externally focused "swing" justice,
instead, would focus on how others perceive her. Perhaps she would cultivate
a reputation of neutrality; perhaps she would want to be known as the "critical
vote"; perhaps she would want groups with disparate ideologies to view her
vote as gettable. Whatever her methodology or motivation, the externally
focused swing justice will place a high value on cultivating a positive image
with groups that do not demand ideological conformity.
Indeed, the desire to appear independent may prompt some justices to
engage in a type of behavior known as reactance. Reactance speaks to the
desire of individuals to resist challenges to their autonomy (Brehm & Brehm,
1981). In particular, when people feel their independence is threatened, they
will take steps to demonstrate that they are in control of their own behavior.
For example, the Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirmation of abortion rights in
Planned Parenthood v Casey may well be tied to the desires of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter to demonstrate that they were not the
political lackeys of the presidents (Reagan and Bush I) who appointed them
to the Court. Proclaiming that the Court's legitimacy is tied to its ability to
withstand political attacks, these justices made clear that they would not
facilitate efforts by the Reagan and Bush administrations to push for the
overruling of Roe v. Wade. Taken together, these psychological concepts
illustrate some of the difficulties of forming a majority coalition on the
Court. A justice, of course, will not choose to join a coalition if doing so
means they have to cast a vote on a core issue that does not match her central
beliefs. In addition to legal and/or policy preferences, the desire for power,
impression management, and reactance may all contribute to a justice's
refusal to join a coalition. In other words, even if a justice's legal policy
preferences are largely in sync with an existing subgroup on the Court, a
justice might not join it. Put another way: Without strong ideological precommitments to a particular group, Supreme Court justices are likely to value
power and image in ways that make them resistant to forging a majority
coalition.
On the other hand, justices with strong ideological precommitments may
be especially likely to join coalitions. Members of ideologically simpatico
coalitions will agree with each other on issues of high salience to coalition
members; consequently, they will more likely seek to assume power by
forcefully advancing a shared agenda. In other words, members of such a
group have less interest in exercising individualized power by casting the
decisive swing vote; for them, the pursuit of a shared agenda is the most
important manifestation of power. Likewise, justices with strong ideological
precommitments may be less interested in fostering the norm of an impartial,
independent jurist. Rather, when it comes to impression management, the
outside groups they care about are those who share their values and objectives. Compare, for example, Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. Kennedy—consistent with "swing" justice behavior—places a high
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value on the opinions of the news media and other elites; Thomas identifies
closely with ideologically conservative groups (Baum, 2006, pp. 132, 142144). If there are 5 or more ideologically simpatico justices, a majority
coalition may form. The key variable, as noted above, is whether these justices
have sufficiently strong ideological precommitments to overcome the basic
obstacles to group formation. For example, in determining whether a justice
will join a group, it may require more than the justice agreeing with other
members on the preferred outcome and legal reasoning in any given issue
space. A justice not strongly precommitted to the group's agenda may place a
higher value on the exercise of individual power or cultivating a reputation
for judicial independence. Perhaps for this reason, Justice Anthony Kennedy
broke ranks with the Rehnquist Court's "conservative bloc" by switching his
initial conference votes in high visibility school prayer and abortion cases.
(Greenburg, 2007, pp. 145 160).
The appointments-confirmation process also stands as a substantial
obstacle to the formation of an ideologically simpatico majority coalition,
especially with regard to controversial, highly salient issues. Because justices
have life tenure, it is very unlikely that appointments to the Court will be
clustered closely together. Such clustering of appointments facilitates group
formation (Arrow et al., 2000, p. 69). In the case of the Court, this is both
because people who join an existing organization tend to identify with others
who join at the same time and because such clustering means that the same
president and Senate will be making the appointments, increasing the likelihood of clustered appointees being relatively closely aligned ideologically.
For example, as we will discuss near the end of this chapter, President
Roosevelt's clustering of Supreme Court appointments from 1938 to 1943
figured prominently in the New Deal Court's dramatic expansion of government power over the economy. At the same time, this perfect storm of closely
clustered appointments and other factors that would help overcome the
barriers to group formation rarely occurs.
-

Applying the Psychological Perspective

Social psychology explains both the ramifications of group formation on the
Supreme Court and the innumerable roadblocks that typically stand in the
way of group formation. When there is no dominant majority coalition on
Me Court, social psychology suggests that concerns of power and image
(including reactance) stand in the way of justices voting their true legal
and/or policy preferences. And when there is an ideologically cohesive
majority, social psychology suggests that intergroup dynamics will play an
important role in defining the Court's decision as well as the willingness of
justices to stick with the coalition on issues that are not core to the group's
identity. This section will provide a preliminary test of the social psychology
model. We will compare the willingness of the Rehnquist and New Deal
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Courts both to overrule precedent and to issue consequential rule-like (as
opposed to minimalist fact-specific) decisions. For both Courts, we will focus
on two issue sets—congressional power and individual rights.
Before turning to our discussion of these two Courts, two clarifying
comments: First, even though this paper highlights significant differences
between the social psychology and dominant political science models, these
models overlap in significant respects. Most important, just as political
science models talk about the pursuit of legal policy preferences, social
psychology likewise talks about the importance of personal beliefs to an
individual's willingness to join a group. For this very reason, it is often the
case that the social psychology model and the political science models will
both point to personal beliefs as a principal motivation for a justice's decisions. More to the point, the social psychology and political science models
both anticipate that the Court is more likely to generate consequential precedents when there is an ideologically simpatico coalition of five or more
justices. Likewise, when there is no such coalition, each of these models
recognizes that the median justices' views are often controlling. At the same
time, social psychology provides a much more nuanced explanation for
Supreme Court decision making. That explanation has strong empirical
foundations and, as such, we think that political scientists must do more
than demonstrate the predictive powers of their models. They must also
explain why Supreme Court Justices do not function like other individuals
who operate in a group dynamic. Second, in discussing the Rehnquist and
New Deal Courts, our objective is quite limited. Specifically, we want to see if
these two Courts superficially track the social psychology model discussed in
the preceding section. A more detailed, empirical assessment still needs to be
done—and we hope to do that in another paper. For reasons we will now
discuss, Rehnquist and New Deal Court decision making seem to follow the
social psychology model discussed in this chapter.

The New Deal Court
The New Deal Court (1937-1949) was, in critical respects, two Courts. On
issues involving Congress's power to regulate the economy, an ideologically
simpatico majority coalition operated as a cohesive group. Those issues were
central to the group's identity. On individual rights issues, however, the Court
was anything but coherent. These issues, while of great national significance,
were not central to the group's identity.
To start, the New Deal Court was forged by President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. Roosevelt used his appointments power to nominate eight justices
during a five-year period, 1938-1943. More than that, Roosevelt used his
appointments power to celebrate the New Deal's embrace of big government,
especially the power of government to regulate the economy. Roosevelt felt
compelled to do so because the pre-1937 Supreme Court had taken the
country back to its "horse and buggy" days by overturning several New
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Deal initiatives; indeed, Roosevelt promised—when introducing his ill-fated
Court-packing plan—to appoint justices who "will not undertake to override
the judgment of Congress on legislative policy" (quoted in Devins & Fisher,
2004, p. 61).
Roosevelt did just that; his appointees were committed New Dealers who,
from the moment they joined the Court, advanced an expansive view of the
federal government's power to regulate the national economy. From 1937 to
1944, the New Deal Court had created a "new constitutional order," overruling thirty cases—"two thirds as many as had been overruled in the Court's
previous history" (Leuchtenburg, 1995, pp. 208-215). Over the course of its
twelve-year tenure (1937-1949), the Court "throroughly repudiated the
entire doctrinal system of constitutional limitations of federal power over
the national economy" (Ackerman, 1999, p. 47). It handed down 42 rulings
that overturned at least 59 of its prior decisions. The majority of these
decisions had broad support—only five were decided by a 5-to-4 vote (as
compared to 10 unanimous overruling decisions).
Group dynamics, as well as the legal policy preferences of the justices,
likely figured into New Deal Court decision making. As discussed earlier,
justices who are part of an ideologically simpatico majority coalition seek
power by voting with the coalition. Likewise, rather than cultivate an image of
impartiality by refusing to join a coalition, justices who are part of a majority
coalition pay attention to audiences that agree with the core agenda of that
coalition. Perhaps most significant, justices on an ideologically simpatico
majority do not necessarily vote their personal preferences—instead, they
allow the group dynamic to shape their final vote.
Consider, for example, the New Deal Court's 1942 decision in Wickard v.
Wickard concerned the power of the secretary of agriculture, acting
pursuant to the Agriculture Adjustment Act, to extend a quota on wheat
production to a farmer who grew wheat for home consumption. In upholding
the secretary's power, the Court issued a sweeping opinion—ruling that
Congress may regulate economic conduct "trivial by itself" so long as the
aggregation of similar activity by other actors affects interstate commerce
(Wickard v. Fawn, 1942, pp. 127-128). For our purposes, Wickard is
especially instructive because some justices on the Court put aside personal
misgivings about the decision's reach in order to forge a pathbreaking ruling
that reflected the core beliefs of the New Deal.
Before Wickard, the Court encouraged Congress to make findings that
commerce indeed was affected. In this way, the justices placed the ball in
Congress's court, for once Congress found facts, it would be very difficult for
the Court to meaningfully check Congress. Nonetheless, in the years preceding W i ckard, Congress contributed to the Court's approval of New Deal
initiatives through its "sustained and thoughtful" showing that there was, in
act, an integrated national economy (Frickey, 1996, pp. 711-712). When
Congress enacted the Agriculture Adjustment Act, however, lawmakers made
no factual findings. For this very reason, Justice Robert Jackson, who had been
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tasked to write the decision, initially drafted an opinion that would have
remanded the case so that a trial court could make additional factual findings
(Cushman, 2000, p. 1138). Jackson nevertheless backed away from his original opinion and wrote a decision that effectively granted Congress carte
blanche power to regulate anything arguably economic. In private correspondence, Jackson signaled his discomfort with his handiwork. Recognizing that
we no longer have "legal judgment upon economic effects which we can
oppose to the policy judgment made by the Congress in legislation,"
Jackson observed: "I really know of no place ... where we can bound the
doctrine" (quoted in Cushman, 2000, pp. 1143, 1145).
Wickard exemplifies what a coherent Court can do. Committed to a
shared agenda, group members can work together to advance an expansive
vision of the law. Wickard also stands in sharp contrast to New Deal Court
decisions on individual rights. Unlike economic issues (which were core to
the group's formation), civil and individual rights were irrelevant to the
formation of the New Deal Court. Roosevelt wanted justices who would
validate the regulatory state; he was not especially interested in constitutionalizing civil liberties and civil rights. At the time of Court-packing, the
Court's docket had almost no cases implicating civil and individual rights.
But with the Court's approval of sweeping legislative power over economic
issues, the Court inevitably turned its attention to other matters. Reflecting
both changing social conditions and their personal interest in asserting
power, "judges created for themselves a new role in the political system, one
that involved identifying those 'preferred freedoms' or 'suspect classifications' that might provide a basis for trumping the otherwise unrestrained
power of the modern legislature" (Gillman, 1993, pp. 202-203). Here, the
New Deal Justices divided—reflecting the fact that groups organize around
clusters of core issues, that justices will not vote against their legal policy
beliefs on issues of consequence, and that the norm of impartiality pushes
justices away from groups that do not share their core beliefs. In other words,
just as social psychology helps explain why the New Deal Court acted asa
coherent group on economic questions, social psychology is also useful in
understanding why the justices were unwilling to forge a majority coalition
on issues involving civil and individual rights.
The Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) likewise exemplifies the forces that push
against group formation on the Supreme Court. Throughout its history, the
Rehnquist Court was fractured on issues involving civil and individual rights.
But even its much ballyhooed efforts to reinvigorate federalism-based limits
on congressional power proved to be a bust—principally because a majority
coalition was never able to coalesce around these issues. The inability of the
Rehnquist Court to fundamentally transform doctrine, as we will now
explain, is to be expected. Without five justices strongly committed to the
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pursuit of some shared agenda, concerns of power, impression management,
and reactivity stand in the way of group formation.
On civil and individual rights issues, the Rehnquist Court seemed destined
to embrace Reagan's vision of judicial conservatism. When running for president in 1980 and 1984, Ronald Reagan both pledged to appoint judges "who
share our commitment to judicial restraint" and reached out to social conservatives by condemning Supreme Court decisions on school prayer, busing, and
especially abortion (Devins & Fisher, 2004, quoting Republican party platform).
But two of Reagan's four nominees, Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony
Kennedy, refiised to embrace the social conservative agenda—so much so that
"Republican domination of the Court" did not result "in the overruling of a
single revolutionary Warren )or Burger] Court decision" (Nagel, 2006).
On social issues, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were anything but
precommitted to the social conservative agenda. Reagan picked O'Connor
to fulfill his pledge to nominate the first woman to the Supreme Court.
Accounts of his decision to nominate her make clear that ideology was not
central to Reagan's decision ('Tobin, 2007, pp. 17-18). Kennedy's selection is
even more telling. Reagan initially nominated Robert Bork for that seat—but
civil rights and abortion rights groups strenuously objected to that nomination and the Senate rejected Bork. Reagan's second choice, Douglas Ginsburg,
withdrew from consideration after newspapers revealed embarrassing personal details. Kennedy was selected to stave off further embarrassments;
ideology entered the calculus but it was not figural in Kennedy's nomination
(Greenburg, 2007, pp. 35-65).
Kennedy and O'Connor repudiated the social conservative agenda by,
among other things, voting to reaffirm earlier rulings on school prayer and
abortion rights. Reactance may well have been a contributing factor to these
decisions. O'Connor and Kennedy also acted in ways that expanded their
personal power and fostered their reputation for judicial independence.
Kennedy, in particular, seemed concerned with his public persona. His
decisions to reaffirm Court rulings on school prayer and abortion rights
may not have reflected his true preferences—but, instead, his desire to
exercise power in ways that would distance himself from the Reagan administration's social conservative agenda. According to one of his law clerks,
Kennedy "would constantly refer to how it's going to be perceived, how the
papers are going to do it, and how it's going to look" (Tushnet, 2005, p. 176,
quoting an anonymous Kennedy clerk). On the very day that the Court
reaffirmed Roe, Kennedy told a reporter, "is Jometimes you don't know if
you're Caesar about to cross the Rubicon or Captain Queeg cutting your own
low line " (quoted in Greenburg, 2007, p. 159). Kennedy, moreover, seemed
determined to "occupy the pivot" on the Court. According to one account,
Kennedy sought to maneuver himself to the center—and "even boasted of
employing this strategy" (Lithwick, 2004, p. 25; Lazarus, 1998, p. 515).
Kennedy's concerns for power are further revealed in a 2005 interview; he
spoke about Supreme Court justices' "shapl Mg) the destiny of the country,"
.
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noting that "in any given year, we make more important decisions than the
legislative branch does" (quoted in Rosen, 2007b, p. 17).
For her part, Justice O'Connor made extensive use of fact-specific concurring opinions to keep her options open in future cases and, more importantly, to tell litigants that "the outcome of a case goes through her"—so
much so that litigants spoke about "writing for an audience of one" when
crafting Supreme Court briefs (Brust, 2005, p. 37; Estrich & Sullivan, 1989,
p. 119). "As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor votes, so goes the Court," wrote
one commentator, and it is undeniable that O'Connor was aware of both the
power she wielded and her legacy as the Court's first women justice (Lazarus,
2000). O'Connor's "flexible, context specific approach" was most pronounced in cases implicating civil and individual rights (Maveety, 1996,
p. 31). In a prominent voting rights case, O'Connor filed a concurrence to a
decision she authored (Bush v. Vera, 1996, pp. 990-995). When concurring to
a decision rejecting a constitutional right to physician assisted suicide,
O'Connor's reasoning fundamentally limited the majority opinion—so
much so that Justice Stephen Breyer joined the concurrence "except insofar
as it joins the majority"( Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 789). Whatever
her motivations, O'Connor did not want to be pinned down. She wanted to
make her mark through individuated fact-specific decisions of limited reach,
decisions that would make her the focal point of subsequent cases.
Without a solid coalition of five ideologically simpatico justices, the
Rehnquist Court's civil and individual rights legacy was inconsequential.
The Court did not "make a single move that would radically change or
unsettle existing constitutional doctrine" (Friedman, 2002, p. 146). The
Rehnquist Court's federalism revival, for the most part, tells a similar story.
Unlike civil and individual rights, the Rehnquist Court did pursue doctrinal
innovations on federalism (Merrill, 2003, p. 584-86). More than that, commentators initially labeled a group consisting of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist as the "federalism five." But the
federalism revival, ultimately, was more bust than boom; the Court overturned only one significant precedent and, ultimately, backed away from its
campaign to limit congressional power under the Commerce Clause and
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In cases decided in 2003, 2004,
and 2005, four of the five so-called federalism five distinguished earlier
Rehnquist Court rulings in order to back up congressional power. The only
justice to consistently vote in favor of limits on Congress was Clarence
Thomas.
The failure of the federalism revival is tied to the simple fact that federalism-qua-federalism was never a core issue to the so-called federalism five.
Presidents Reagan and Bush never used federalism as a measuring stick
when screening candidates; the Senate paid no mind to federalism during its
confirmation hearings. The focus, instead, was on first-order policy issues—
race, privacy, religion. Unlike the New Deal era (where Court limits on
congressional power frustrated Roosevelt's pursuit of a fundamental
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restructuring of the regulatory state), elected officials neither pushed for nor
resisted Rehnquist Court efforts to place some federalism-based limits on
congressional power (Devins, 2004). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that a core group could not form around this low salience issue and,
in so doing, invalidate laws that they otherwise supported.
For our purposes, the Rehnquist Court highlights the various roadblocks
that stand in the way of group formation on the Supreme Court. Groups form
around core issues and, in part, that requires the appointment and confirmation of justices who are precommitted to the pursuit of some agenda.
Otherwise, median or "swing" justices will resist banding together with
other justices—for these "swing" justices are likely to place a high value on
power and/or their image. Indeed, the Reagan administration's embrace of
the social conservative agenda may well have boomeranged, in that, "swing"
justices—consistent with reactance—felt that their independence was threatened by the administration's assault on the Court.

Conclusion
Social psychology provides important insights into group formation on the
Supreme Court. In particular, unlike political science models, which emphasize
the pursuit of legal and policy preferences, social psychology highlights the
importance of group processes and how issues of power and reputation also
contribute to group formation on the Supreme Court. In so doing, social
psychology suggests that political scientists overemphasize the median justice
benchmark. When a majority coalition forms, intragroup dynamics define the
scope of the Court's ruling. Those dynamics reflect group preferences, not
the preferences of the median justice. And when there is no majority coalition,
the median justice may well be influenced by concerns of power and reputation—concerns that may lead the median justice to vote in ways that do not
necessarily reflect her true legal policy preferences. Through limited case studies
on the New Deal and Rehnquist Courts, there is reason to think that justices—
like other humans—operate within the boundaries of group dynamics. That, of
course, is not to denigrate the profoundly important role of legal policy
preferences. Justices, according to the social psychology model, will never cast
votes that do not jibe with their core beliefs. At the same time, the dominant
political science models offer a too simplistic picture of Supreme Court decision making.

Note
Thanks to David Klein, Greg Mitchell, Lee Epstein, Larry Baum, and especially John
Nezlek.

